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0. Introducing the Author 
 
This issue of “Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics” collects international and 
interdisciplinary contributions devoted to the thought of one of the most 
original and renowned contemporary masters in phenomenology: the German 
philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels.1  
Waldenfels‟ philosophical orientation – characterized both by a close 
dialogue with the doctrine of his French master Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
a thorough confrontation with thinkers such as Husserl, Foucault, Levinas, 
Ricoeur and Derrida2 – can be traced back to that constellation of thinking 
which, by putting at its center the phenomenon of intersubjectivity,  
attempts to show how every domain of human experience is faced by a 
constitutive intervention of alterity as an element calling for constant 
questioning and inevitable transformations. 
Within this paradigm, Waldenfels offers, however, an undoubtedly original 
contribution,  since he does not remain at the level of a general doctrine of 
otherness, but rather: by exactly “bending” the category of alterity towards 
the notion of alienness (Fremdheit), he charges the other with a peculiar 
factical density, which frees it from the latent risk of a mere logical-
ontological opposition to the category of the same. Hence, through this 
philosophical twist, Waldenfels proposes a genuine phenomenological 
discourse, which, by avoiding the abstract duality otherness/sameness, places 
the other on the very plural and unstable terrain of factical experience. 
                                                          
1 I would like to express here my gratitude to the editorial board of the journal for having 
accepted the publishing of this issue devoted to Bernhard Waldenfels‟ philosophy. Equal 
gratitude goes also to all contributors, without whose scientific effort this project would 
have never been realized.   
2 Proof of this constant dialogue can be found in the whole work of Waldenfels. I limit 
myself to mention here the volumes in which such a confrontation acquires explicit traits: 
Cf. B. Waldenfels, Phänomenologie in Frankreich, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1983; Id., 
Deutsch-Französische Gedankengänge, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1995; Id., Idiome des 
Denkens. Deutsch-Französische Gedankengänge II, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2005.     
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It is exactly this constitutive plural character of experience, in which 
alienness is constantly involved, what makes Waldenfels‟ phenomenology 
particularly open to confrontations with several discourse domains. We can 
recall here his dialogue with and responses from disciplines like psychology, 
psychoanalysis, psychiatry, pedagogy, ethnology, sociology, political theory, 
ethics, theology, legal studies, linguistics, as well as architecture and arts (in 
its several expressions).  
There is no need to spend here much more effort in order to assert the 
dialogical and open character of Waldenfels‟ phenomenology of alienness, as 
its evidence – I believe – is absolutely well disclosed by the very broad 
domain of contributions gathered in this issue. What I would like to provide, 
instead, is a general orientation map for the readers who approach 
Waldenfels‟ thought for the first time, and this with the hope to offer them, 
firstly, the indispensable tools in order to better appreciate the essays 
collected here and, secondly, a good reason for starting an independent 
research path within the work of this master in phenomenology.         
 
 
1. The Role of Alienness Within Experience 
 
Waldenfels‟ whole phenomenological effort is centered on a very clear and 
strong point of departure: as long as we assume the phenomenon of the alien 
in terms of “something” or “someone”, i.e. as an unproblematic accessible 
object of research, which stays more or less in front of us, we will have missed 
it from the start. In this case, indeed, our attitude, despite its willingness to 
being open or its inclination to repulsion towards the alien, would keep 
following the traditional structure of thought, according to which “alienness” 
is certainly admitted, however, only under a clear premise: alien can only be 
thought of starting from the sphere of property, the sphere of the own, that 
is, a realm to which indubitable ontological priority and hierarchical 
superiority are to be ascribed. By following this perspective, what would be 
inevitably affirmed is that consolidated interpretation of experience, 
according to which the alien, for how much it might represent a destabilizing 
moment within the own, is nevertheless bound to undergo a process of final 
overcoming and re-appropriation, thanks to which, in the end, the 
presupposed and unquestioned priority of the own itself is reestablished. 
This kind of unquestioned certainty, which gives a clear priority to the 
own, is the attitude underlying all the traditional operations of thought 
which, while on the one hand foresee an indubitable participation or 
intervention of the alien, on the other hand return too easily to the own self, 
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since nothing can really question the own, if the own is guaranteed a higher 
originarity (Ursprünglichkeit) since the beginning. Just to quote some 
examples of this traditional attitude, we may refer to Hegel‟s dialectic, in 
which alienness appears only as Entfremdung, i.e. as a transitory form in a 
process in which consciousness tends to “overcome the being alien” and 
“discover” the world and the present as its “own property”.3 This is also the 
case of Gadamer‟s hermeneutics, whose task, despite its weaker pretentions if 
compared to the Hegelian project, remains the overcoming of the alien, that 
is, the recovery of comprehension as a more originary condition, in which the 
ownness of sense is to be presupposed to every interruption produced by an 
alien incomprehension.4 The same strategy is also at work in the Habermas‟ 
communication discourse which, starting from the presupposition of a 
common logos, common sense and communicative reason, does not allow the 
intervention of any radical alien, but only the participation of a relative 
alien,5 who can therefore always be part of a successful strategy of inclusion.6 
In this sense, Habermas‟ communicative strategy, by founding itself on the 
premise of a given symmetrical reciprocity of the participants, far from 
giving itself as an “inter-realm of dialogue”7 between own and alien, works as 
a monologue put into scene dialogically.8 
Precisely here Waldenfels inserts his main critical warning: speaking of 
alienness does not coincide by any means with the mere addressing of an 
accessory moment, a transactional stage or a simply depriving modification 
of a nevertheless solid and only slightly alterable sphere of ownness. On the 
contrary, if something like a genuine experience of the alien is to be assumed 
at all, then the alien has to be conceived of in constitutive terms, that is, as 
an originary pathos9 which involves the own since the beginning and, 
                                                          
3 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, in Id., Werke, vol. 3, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 
a.M. 1986.   
4 Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik, 
Mohr, Tübingen 1975, pp. 217, 345, 445.  
5  Cf. B. Waldenfels, In den Netzen der Lebenswelt, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1985, pp. 94-
119. 
6 Cf. J. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2005. 
7 Cf. B. Waldenfels, Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in 
Anschluss an Edmund Husserl, Martinus Nijhoff, Den Haag 1971. 
8 Cf. Id., Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. Phänomenologie – Psychoanalyse – Phänomenotechnik, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2002, pp. 226-233. 
9 Pathos represents one of the principal guiding concepts around which Waldenfels insists 
starting from his book Bruchlinien der Erfahrung. A resuming but poignant reprise of this 
theme can be found in the recent monograph: Id., Sinne und Künste im Wechselspiel. Modi 
Ästhetischer Erfahrung, Suhrkamp, Berlin 2010, pp. 323-325.  
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therefore, time and again. In other words: the alien, by involving ownness 
from the very start, reappears in the sphere of the own every time that the 
own undergoes the experience or the event of an alteration bringing it out of 
itself.10 In more accurate terms, such a pathic alteration manifests itself in 
forms like experienced withdrawal, expropriation, displacement, differing; 
forms which make impossible for the own to be – as Freud would say – 
“master in its own house”.11 
What Waldenfels calls for is, hence, a perspective inversion, according to 
which it is to be considered as a major phenomenological mistake to 
presuppose the original condition of a solid self-referential experience, in 
which something “alien” would occasionally and extrinsically happen. 
Rather, it is precisely the alien that which sneaks into experience since the 
beginning and makes, therefore, any process of total appropriation 
impossible.12 
 
 
2. The Places of Alienness 
 
When it comes to detecting the phenomenon of the alien in terms of originary 
withdrawal, differing or non-coincidence in the realm of the own, Waldenfels, 
as radical phenomenologist, does not make use of any speculative 
instruments, but rather looks at decisive places of experience, in which all of 
us are concretely involved.13 The first one of such places is temporal 
experience, which goes back “to the primordial fact of birth, to an original 
past, a past „which has never been present‟ (Merleau-Ponty) and will never be 
present, in that I always arrive too late in order to catch it in flagrante”.14 
The same can be said of the experience of the proper name, which is actually 
“a name through which others call us, which we respond to and haven‟t 
decided to give to ourselves” but “have received from others as a brand”.15 A 
similar logic turns out to be also at work as soon as we think of the 
                                                          
10 Cf. Id., Phänomenologie der Aufmerksamkeit, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, pp. 33-42. 
11 Cf. S. Freud, A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, in Id., An Infantile 
Neurosis and Other Works, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVII (1917-1919), Vintage Classics, London 1975.  
12 Cf. B. Waldenfels, Verfremdung der Moderne. Phänomenologische Grenzgänge, Wallstein, 
Göttingen 2001, pp. 50-51. 
13 Cf. Id., Topographie des Fremden. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 1, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.M. 1997, p. 26. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 30.  
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constitutive fact that “it has been spoken to me before I spoke to others”.16 
This primordial condition has an extraordinary relevance, since it represents 
the very genealogical basis both for any further genuine intersubjective 
experience, in terms of a radical being-exposed to the other, and for the 
learning of any further foreign language, which clearly does not start at 
school, but rather in the apprehending of the mother tongue as a first foreign 
language.17 A last example of how the alien intervenes in the midst of the 
most proper and intimate sphere of the own is given by the experience of the 
mirror. In such an experience we unavoidably look at ourselves through a 
stranger‟s eyes and, therefore, we undergo an inevitable moment of non-
recognition, hesitation, and – in extreme cases – even surprise or fright, 
which “would be inconceivable if „I‟ were simply „I‟ or if I could always fully 
return back to myself”.18 Far from attesting an original self-reference of the 
own self, this kind of experience testifies, indeed, in the very best manner 
what Waldenfels often communicates through quoting the famous 
Rimbaud‟s refrain: JE est un autre.19 
Waldenfels, however, locates his constitutive presence of alienness within 
the own not only in the realm of “subjective” experience, but also at a more 
extended level, which concerns the orders of experience, in whose domain our 
lives acquire their general meanings and orientation.20 Orders, in fact, are also 
constitutively inhabited by alienness, in that the very operation by which 
they are instituted is a selective one. In other words, every order, by 
detaining its structural feature in the fact that it makes “appear something so 
and not otherwise”,21 makes possible, accessible and “proper” something by 
simultaneously making impossible, inaccessible and “alien” something else. 
Thus, order as such always draws inclusive borders by marking 
simultaneously the margin of its overcoming or transgression. In this 
context, the alien, by representing that which constitutively “withdraws 
itself from the order‟s grasp”,22 can be conceived of as the extra-ordinary, 
which exceeds, surmounts and, therefore, can constantly put into question 
the order itself, by maintaining alive its contingent structure and its 
impossibility to give itself as a totality. 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Cf. Id., Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 
2006, Chap. 4.4. 
18 Id., Topographie des Fremden, pp. 30-31. 
19 Cf. Id., Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden, Chap. 1.4. 
20 Cf. Id., Ordnung im Zwielicht, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1987. 
21 Ibid., p. 10. 
22 Ibid., p. 20. 
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What follows from this consideration is that no order, as originally 
inhabited by the alien, may claim to actually possess itself and have access to 
its founding moment in terms of a surely acquired property, thanks to which 
it could consequently claim to exhibit itself out of a position of exclusive self-
referentiality. Waldenfels has always been radically critical towards this form 
of unjustified total autarchy or – as Rada Ivekovic would put it – mere 
«autism»23 of the order. In his words, one should instead bear in mind that 
“every originary foundation shows itself as a retroactive foundation, or better: as 
a plurality of a posteriori foundations. […] Just like the birth of a singular 
individual, also the birth of a clan, people or culture has to be taken as an 
event which cannot be transformed into an own act. A past, which for me or 
for us has never been present, allows only to go back to it in the form of a 
determined reprise, which catches and prosecutes an originary prise, without 
exhausting it, and therefore is exposed to a constant surprise”.24  
It is exactly in this imminent surprise, i.e. in the constant possibility of its 
coming, that the own never ends dealing with the alien, that is, never ends 
facing the withdrawal by which it is inhabited since the beginning.                      
 
  
3. Responding: the Discourse of the Alien 
 
Such a radical notion of alienness, as one may now easily deduce, brings high 
troubles within the traditional and established strategies of discourse. In fact, 
if the alien is to be conceived of as something manifesting itself only where it 
expropriates, destabilizes and exceeds the own, then a thorny question 
immediately arises: how to make the alien accessible without betraying it?  
Indeed, any kind of intentional approach to it or attempt to thematize it 
would end up staging the alien, with the final result of depriving it of its 
constitutive “goad (Stachel)”.25 A dilemma arises here: either we speak about 
the alien and, therefore, inevitably transgress it – as we would make present 
that which is meant to be what it is only in its withdrawal from the own –, or 
we remain silent on it and, consequently, in order to adequately correspond 
to it, we do not approach it at all. 
However, a philosophical attempt that stops at the stage of such an 
alternative between saying too much and saying nothing would be justified 
only if this would represent all it can be said about the phenomenon of the 
                                                          
23 Cf. R. Ivekovic, L’autisme communautaire, in «Transeuropéennes», 9, 1996-97, pp. 68-
69. 
24 B. Waldenfels, Topographie des Fremden, p. 138. 
25 Cf. Id., Der Stachel des Fremden, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1990. 
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alien and its (im)possible discourse. Yet, Waldenfels shows that this is not at 
all the case, as the possibility of another mode of discourse does exist and it 
can be traced as soon as we stop speaking (or remaining silent) about the alien 
and start instead speaking from the alien.  
Nevertheless one may ask, at this point, where and whether such a speech 
from the alien makes itself possible. Waldenfels‟ answer to this question is 
both simple and rich of implications. It is simple because he warns us that 
such a discourse implies neither the difficult effectuation of a nostalgic and 
rather nebulous “step behind”, à la Heidegger, nor the awaiting of a quite 
ungraspable speech-to-come in a messianic style. Rather, this speech – 
Waldenfels tells us – is already at work within experience, and it takes place 
whenever we start from the same request, provocation, appeal, pretension 
(Anspruch) through which the alien announces itself, by obliging us to 
respond to it. Therefore, if we look for a discourse in which the alien is not 
deprived of its constitutive character, we can only find it – so Waldenfels 
proposes – in the “register of response”.26 Responding, in fact, on one side, 
has the capability of not robbing the alien of its goad, as the response itself 
starts not from a subjective or thematizing act by the own self, but always in 
delay and as a pathic experience, that is, exactly from the same request of 
the alien, to which the answer is called to reply. On the other side, however, 
response can be interpreted as originarily indispensible and this in the 
Derridian sense of an original supplementary structure,27 since response is the 
only place where the request of the alien can come into appearance at all. 
Indeed, out of the trace left in the provoked answer, the alien would result as 
inaccessible. In this sense, Waldenfels writes: “Only in responding to that 
which we are hit from, appears that which hits as such”.28    
It is exactly this double – simultaneously delayed and originary – 
character of response29 that explains the reason why Waldenfels maintains, 
on the one hand, that the alien, by manifesting itself in its withdrawal, has 
no space of appearance other than the answer that it provokes (alien cannot 
manifest itself other than in the “that to which (Worauf) the answer”30 
relates); and, on the other hand, that the alien, by exactly commencing 
                                                          
26 This one is exactly the title of one of the most important books by Waldenfels: 
Antwortregister, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1994.  
27 Waldenfels himself, in different places of his work, describes the way in which the 
structure of the original supplementary temporality intervenes in the articulation of 
response. Cf. for example Id., Grundmotive einer Phänomenologie des Fremden, Chap. 3.3.  
28 Id., Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, p. 59. 
29 Cf. Id., Ortsverschiebungen, Zeitverschiebungen. Modi leibhaftiger Erfahrung, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt a.M. 2009, pp. 143-148. 
30 Id., Topographie des Fremden, p. 180. 
FERDINANDO G. MENGA 
14 
 
through  the same provocation it enacts, can never be completely exhausted 
by the delayed answer.  
This is therefore the overall frame proposed by Waldenfels: the only way of 
relating to the alien, accomplishing to avoid its reduction, is the response 
imposed by the same request/call coming from the alien itself. This is the real 
event of responsivity (Responsivität).  
Once this basic articulation of response is grasped, it is quite easy to follow 
Waldenfels in the description of the further implications, which every 
answering brings with it. In particular, four aspects must be mentioned 
here.31  
First of all, response is inevitably limited because, by always coming too 
late in relation to the request which provokes it, it can never fully grasp and 
exhaust the alien to whom it has to answer: “The alien becomes what it is in 
no other place than the event of responding; this means that it never allows 
to be completely and univocally defined. That which we answer to always 
surmounts that which we give in/as the answer”. 32 In this sense, the 
confrontation with the alien, far from accomplishing itself in terms of a final 
response, is constantly open to further and future possibilities of answer.  
Secondly, response is unavoidable because it can never anticipate and 
therefore avoid the same provocation which puts it into scene. This brings us 
to the very important implication that also a refusal to answer is already a 
form of answering to the alien. Such a consideration is by no means a 
secondary detail, once we start thinking that the “silence” towards the alien‟s 
requests can certainly become a political strategy full of consequences.33 
Thirdly, response is structurally asymmetrical since the relationship 
between the own and the alien does not ever take place before the act of 
answering itself, i.e. it does not take place in the domain of a third, neutral, 
transcultural or universal terrain, where own and alien would be 
symmetrical, comparable, measurable and even interchangeable. Instead, the 
relationship of the own with the alien, by taking place solely within the 
response‟s domain and, consequently, always in delay, implies that the own 
itself can never become symmetrical with the alien. This consideration has 
important implications since it warns us that any presumed third and neutral 
place – in which own and alien were to be made equal – not only does not 
exist at all, but, whenever it is affirmed, is nothing less than a camouflage 
                                                          
31 A compact presentation of such aspects can be found in Id., Grenzen der Normalisierung. 
Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 2, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2008 (II ed.), pp. 
93-94. 
32 Id., Topographie des Fremden, p. 52.  
33 Cf. Id., Schattenrisse der Moral, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 2006, pp. 49 f. 
Guest Editor’s Preface 
15 
 
strategy through which the own or – as Judith Butler would put it – the 
“parochial property of dominant culture”,34 more or less consciously, 
pretends to impose its home-made perspective as the universal one.35 Precisely 
at this stage, all Eurocentric or globalizing discourses display their very 
concrete – and by no means universal – point of departure and, therefore, 
also the possibility of a genealogical unmasking of their untenable 
“totalizing” pretensions.36                       
Lastly, response always possesses a creative trait.37 In fact, every answer, 
by starting from a non-anticipatable and hence unpredictable request of the 
alien, is inevitably constituted by a certain amount of unpreparedness and 
consequently by an at least minimal amount of inventiveness.38 Such an 
inventive character, which derives from the delayedness and limitedness of 
every answer, can be therefore understood as a necessarily contingent trait of 
any responsive act. In other words, by being structurally contingent, no 
answer can ever pretend to be the final or the best answer, but, at most, a 
possibly renewable response, a response which can be changed and 
transformed according to the occasional and historical events of request, 
appeal, demand of the alien. To use Waldenfels‟ terminology, since no 
response has the access to a “first word”, no response has the possibility to 
become a “last word”39 either; since no response is the master of its own 
beginning, no response can be the master of its own end either. Answering, in 
this respect – and with this we may conclude –, can be considered as the very 
constitutive articulation of a constantly open and never accomplishable 
human discourse taking place among us. As Blanchot would call it: an 
entretien infini.40 
                                                          
34 J. Butler, Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism, in J. Butler, 
E. Laclau, S. Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony,Universality. Contemporary Dialogues on the 
Left, Verso, London – New York 2000, p. 15. 
35 Cf. B. Waldenfels, Idiome des Denkens, p. 230.  
36 Fruitful reflections on this topic may be found in Id., Topographie des Fremden, pp. 48-
50; Id., Anderswo statt Überall, in Id., Idiome des Denkens, pp. 331-341; Id., Grundmotive 
einer Phänomenologie des Fremden, pp. 121-124. 
37 This aspect of response shows clearly how Waldenfels assumes and originally develops 
one of the most important philosophical motives of his French master Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, i.e. the concept of “creative expression”. A closer description of this appropriation 
may be found  in B. Waldenfels, Das Paradox des Ausdrucks, in Id., Deutsch-Französische 
Gedankengänge, pp. 105-123.   
38 Cf. Id., Bruchlinien der Erfahrung, p. 125. 
39 Cf. Id., Antwortregister, pp. 269-270. Cf. also Id., Vielstimmigkeit der Rede. Studien zur 
Phänomenologie des Fremden 4, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1999, p. 60. 
40 Cf. M. Blanchot, L’entretien infini, Gallimard, Paris 1969. 
